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BY MITCHELL BERLIN
T
￿We Control the Vertical￿:







he Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has expanded
the set of products and services banks and
other financial firms can provide to their
customers. But how will financial institutions orga-
nize their production? In this article, Mitchell Berlin
discusses three broad approaches to vertical integra-
tion and the pros and cons of a firm￿s providing all
stages of production and distribution.
How can a bank (or any firm)
decide how much of the chain of
production and distribution it should
carry out on its own?  For example,
should a bank that offers a line of
profitable credit cards handle its own
back-office operations, a move that
economists call backward integration?
And when (if ever) should a technology
firm that has been content to provide
information-processing services to retail
financial firms (such as banks) decide to
integrate forward and provide financial
services directly to the public?  Ques-
tions such as these have become
particularly pressing for bankers and
their competitors now that the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 has expanded
the products and services that banks
and other financial firms can provide.
One standard answer is that
complementary products and services
are more profitably produced by a single
firm, but the real answer is not that
simple.1 True, complementary activities
are often carried out by vertically
integrated firms,2 but they are also
carried out by separate firms specializing
in single stages of production or
distribution. A prominent example is life
insurance. Underwriting insurance and
selling insurance are almost surely
complementary activities. But insurance
companies market policies through two
different channels. They use agents
who sell only their own company￿s
products, and they also use independent
agents who sell the products of multiple
insurance companies.3
Although this article focuses
on vertical integration, particularly
forward integration into retailing, many
of the same issues arise when a firm
decides whether to expand its product
line to include products or services that
are not vertically related. 4
Economists have been puzzling
over this issue for more than 70 years
under the general rubric the theory of
the firm.5  In a classic article in 1937,
Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase first
posed the (seemingly) simple question:
When will a transaction be carried out
within a single firm rather than by two
separate firms transacting in the market?
Although economists have
proposed a multitude of theories to
answer this question, there is some
common ground: The best way to
structure a transaction depends on how
it affects the incentives of the parties to
the transaction. (But see Other Models
1Activities are complements when doing one
reduces the cost of doing the other. For
example, originating a loan and providing
credit insurance to the borrower may be
complementary financial activities, since
information about the borrower is reusable.
2A vertically integrated firm is one that
carries out two or more stages of production
or distribution by itself. For example, a firm
that both produces and sells its own products
is vertically integrated.
3Allen Berger, J. David Cummins, and Mary
Weiss￿s article presents empirical evidence
that the coexistence of these two delivery
systems is not merely because one inefficient
system survives alongside an efficient one.
4See my earlier article for a review of some of
the recent empirical evidence on the costs
and benefits of product line specialization and
diversification.
5Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts￿
literature review is an excellent critical
discussion of the theory of the firm.14   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
of Vertical Integration for explanations
that don￿t focus on incentives.)  The
types of incentives that theories of the
firm have emphasized include individu-
als￿ willingness to cooperate in response
to unforeseeable events, their willing-
ness to provide maximum effort, and
their willingness to allocate their time
and attention in a sensible way across a
multitude of competing tasks.
Three broad approaches have
had the most influence in recent years:
the transactions cost approach, the
property rights approach, and the
multitask approach.  In this article I will
use each of these approaches, in turn, to
examine a firm￿s decision to sell through
independent sales representatives or
through an in-house sales group. In
other words, I will look at a firm￿s
decision about whether to integrate
forward into retailing.
IN-HOUSE SALES FORCE OR
INDEPENDENT REPS?
AdaptorDie Corp. (AC) is a
manufacturer of electronic components
with a broad menu of products.6 Like
many other firms in the components
business, AC uses two different
channels for selling its products.
Twenty percent of its compo-
nents are sold through an in-house sales
force that is paid a fixed salary plus a
modest commission for each sale.
Following an almost universal pattern,
AC￿s own sales employees sell only AC
components.
The remaining 80 percent of
AC￿s components are sold through
independent manufacturers￿ representa-
tives such as DirectCell Corp. (DC).
DC￿s relationship with AC is not
exclusive. DC offers a sales package that
includes AC￿s products and also those of
B
roadly, the industrial organization literature has proposed three
motives for vertical integration, in addition to theories that rely
explicitly on incentive or bargaining considerations.a
One classic motive is firms￿ desire to avoid double marginalization
(or the chain of monopolies problem). Consider a monopolist
manufacturer of electronic components selling to a retailer who is
also a monopolist.  If the manufacturer can￿t charge a fixed fee, in
addition to its price per unit sold, it will charge the retailer a price above the
marginal cost of production. Thus, the retailer faces a higher price for the compo-
nent than it would if it could purchase the good in a competitive market.  In turn,
the retailer charges final customers the monopoly price (the price it paid for the
component, plus its own monopoly markup).
The problem with this outcome is that firms produce too little output at
too high a price, from the standpoint of both the firm and the consumer. Firms
would increase their joint profits and increase consumer satisfaction as well if they
integrated and sold the good at a lower price. The integrated firm would maximize
profits by charging consumers a monopoly markup over the marginal cost of
producing the good, a price lower than the one that includes the double markup
charged by successive monopolies.b
The main criticism of double marginalization as a convincing motive for
vertical integration is that there are straightforward contractual solutions to the
problem that don￿t involve vertical integration.  For example, the manufacturer
could set its price equal to the marginal cost of producing each unit of the good
and charge the retailer a fixed fee (as compensation for giving up monopoly
profits).  To be a fully convincing motive for vertical integration, double
marginalization requires some reason such contracts are infeasible, for example, the
contractual difficulties highlighted by the theories in the text.
A second classic motive for vertical integration is vertical foreclosure.
Consider the case of a monopolist supplier of an input necessary to competitive
manufacturers. One of the manufacturers could integrate with the monopolist
supplier to gain a competitive advantage in the market for the final good. Indeed,
the integrated firm might even be able to drive other manufacturers out of the
market. Although this is a plausible motive for integration, the conditions for
vertical foreclosure ￿ a monopolist provider of an input ￿ are clearly restrictive
and can￿t explain many cases of vertical integration observed in the marketplace.
For example, General Motors produces more of its auto components internally than
does Ford, but not because the nature of the inputs is fundamentally different.
A third classic motive for vertical integration is supply assurance.c Accord-
ing to this motive, a manufacturer may wish to guarantee an adequate supply of an
input in the face of uncertainty about its own requirements (say, because of
fluctuating demand for its own manufactured good) or in the face of uncertainty
about the total supply of the input. Like double marginalization, supply assurance
appears to be a sensible explanation for vertical integration, but only in the presence
of the types of contracting and bargaining problems that take center stage in the
approaches discussed in this article.  Without such problems, firms could write
relatively simple contracts to ensure an adequate supply of inputs. For example,
uncertain demand for electricity has not led to vertical integration but to long-term
contracts between electric utilities and coal suppliers.
aJean Tirole￿s excellent textbook has a full chapter devoted to models of vertical integration.
bDouble marginalization is really a special case of a more general class of distortions covered at
length by Tirole under the general heading ￿the basic vertical externality.￿
cSome prominent formal models of the supply assurance motive include the article by Dennis
Carlton and the one by Patrick Bolton and Michael Whinston.
Other Models of Vertical Integration
6My description of AdaptorDie and
DirectCell draws heavily on Erin Anderson
and David C. Schmittlein￿s article. Both firms
are fictional.   Business Review  Q3 2001   15 www.phil.frb.org
other electronics manufacturers,
although, following common practice, it
doesn￿t offer competing versions of the
same component. DC rents its own
office space and hires its own sales staff.
All components are sold on straight
commission, that is, AC pays DC a
percentage of the sale price for each
component sold. However, the unsold
products remain the property of the
manufacturer.
AC￿s use of two distinct sales
channels raises some obvious (and not so
obvious) questions. What types of
components are sold using each
channel? Why does AC use  different
compensation schemes for the two
channels? (Its internal sales force works
for fixed salaries while independent reps
receive a percentage of sales.) A less
obvious question ￿ but only because we
may not think to question a practice
that is so common ￿ is why AC￿s own
sales force is not permitted to sell other
firms￿ components while DC￿s sales force
has a nonexclusive sales relationship?
The answers to questions like these may
shed light on the broader question:
What are the relative advantages and




The transactions cost approach
argues that the answers to these
questions can be found by looking at
the details of individual transactions
between different firms, for example, a
contractual agreement by DC to sell
AC￿s capacitors as part of its sales
package.8 This approach says that costs
inevitably arise as firms bargain and
disagree in the normal course of
conducting business in a rapidly
changing marketplace. Transaction costs
are distinct from production costs such
as AC￿s manufacturing costs or DC￿s
sales costs. Broadly, transaction costs
include all expenses and foregone
opportunities that arise because of actual
bargaining and dickering as well as
expenses borne to avoid potential
disagreements. These costs range from
lost sales when disagreements lead to
delays to lawyers￿ fees when negotia-
tions become so contentious that the
courts (or even the threat to go to the
courts) come into play.
The transactions cost approach
begins with a straightforward thought
experiment: For a particular transaction
￿ such as the sale of capacitors ￿ we
can evaluate the transaction costs that
would arise if separate firms carried out
component will be sold through AC￿s
internal sales force instead, because
incentives to disagree can more easily be
mitigated or overcome within a firm.9
Asset Specificity Creates
Transaction Costs.  The most impor-
tant determinant of transaction costs is
the so-called degree of asset specificity:
the extent to which the transacting
firms invest in assets whose value
depends on the business relationship￿s
remaining intact.
Both AC and DC have made
numerous investments in the course of
their business relationship. For example,
DC invested in office equipment,
including a personal computer for each
of its sales agents. A computer is a
nonspecific asset that can be used to
store and process information about
accounts for any manufacturer; that the
computers currently store information
about orders for AC doesn￿t affect the
value of the computer. And if AC were
to replace DC and find a new manufac-
turers￿ rep, it wouldn￿t spend much time
wondering whether it could find a firm
with equally powerful computers.
7The real world organizational choice is
somewhat more complicated than my
description of a choice between an internal
sales force that sells the firm￿s products
exclusively and the independent sales rep
that has nonexclusive relationships with
many firms. Traditional franchises, such as
gas stations, are independent retailing firms
that have exclusive sales relationships with
gasoline producers. Also, Dell￿s internal sales
personnel sell the products of other computer
companies, for example, Hewlett Packard
printers. These organizational forms may be
thought of as intermediate contractual
solutions.
9This is too simple, since difficulties also arise
when a transaction is handled within a single
firm. We discuss these below, but the
transactions cost approach has a less
distinctive and less complete analysis of the
various costs of keeping transactions carried
out within the firm.
If [transaction costs] are high enough, the
theory predicts that the component will be sold
through [an] internal sales force instead, be-
cause incentives to disagree can more easily
be mitigated or overcome within a firm.
the transaction, that is, if the capacitor
were produced by manufacturer AC
and sold by independent sales represen-
tative DC.  If these costs are high
enough, the theory predicts that the
8Seminal contributions in the transactions
cost approach have been made by Oliver
Williamson and by Benjamin Klein, R.A.
Crawford, and Armen Alchian. See
Williamson￿s 1985 book for a critical summary
of the literature in this tradition.
However, firms also invest in
assets that would lose much, if not all, of
their value if the business relationship
broke down. For example, some16   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
electronic components are not standard-
ized and must be modified to suit a
particular customer￿s needs. Cus-
tomization is a process that requires an
understanding of the customer￿s needs,
an understanding of which modifica-
tions are feasible, and a channel for
communications between product
designers and customers. Thus, the sales
agent must have an intimate knowledge
of the final customer￿s business and must
also have a working relationship with
the manufacturer￿s designers and
engineers.
Knowledge about customers
and working relationships, both of which
take time and effort to build and
nurture, are examples of (intangible)
relationship-specific, or idiosyncratic,
assets.10 If AC and DC parted ways in a
dispute over the feasibility of a
customer￿s demand for a product
modification: (1) AC would lose its
storehouse of  knowledge about the
customers who traditionally purchase
through DC, and (2) the working
relationships between DC￿s sales force
and AC￿s engineers would go up in
smoke.
With so much to lose on both
sides, a complete breakdown in the
business relationship is unlikely. But that
won￿t prevent the firms from haggling
over who receives the gains and who
bears the brunt of making adjustments.
And even if disagreements don￿t
typically lead to a split, haggling can be
time-consuming and expensive. Perhaps
more significant, if everyone expects lots
of disagreements, or if the adjustments
lead to an unequal distribution of the
net gains, firms may avoid making
idiosyncratic investments in the first
place; that is, the willingness to make
valuable investments is undermined
because of individuals￿ unwillingness to
cooperate.
For example, the head of AC￿s
engineering division can centralize (and
restrict) communications between AC￿s
engineers and DC￿s sales force. If
communication is  difficult, working
relationships between sales personnel
and designers may never develop, and
potentially profitable product adjust-
ments may never get proposed. The lost
profit from inflexible product design
should be reckoned an indirect trans-
action cost.
adequate guidance when disagreements
arise.11 For example, for nonstandard-
ized products no one can accurately
predict which customers will seek
customized variants and which changes
they will demand. Thus, for nonstan-
dardized components, uncertainty about
the future is great, and transaction costs
are likely to be high; time-consuming
haggling will be a problem, and the risks
of a bargaining breakdown are likely to
be great.
Customized Products Are
Sold by In-House Sales Forces. Let￿s
push our thought experiment about AC
further.  Divide AC￿s products into two
groups: those that are standardized and
those that are customized to meet
customers￿ demands. Since customized
products require an unpredictable series
of adaptations, and since these will
require significant investments in
idiosyncratic assets (knowledge about
customer needs and relationships
between design and sales personnel),
transaction costs are likely to be high if
such components are sold through
independent sales rep DC.  Theory
predicts that these products are more
likely to be sold through the in-house
sales staff, while AC￿s standardized
products will be sold through DC.
Indeed, this prediction is
supported by the work of Erin Anderson
and David  Schmittlein, who examined
a real-world electronics firm and found
that it sells customized components




Have Advantages When Transaction
Costs Are High.  If difficulties can
afflict transactions between separate
firms, how can keeping the transaction
10Idiosyncratic assets needn￿t be intangible.
The textbook example of an idiosyncratic
asset is Fisher Body￿s plant for producing auto
chassis located right next to Chevrolet￿s
assembly operation.









Costs of Haggling.  In a predictable
business environment, transactions will
be largely routine, and firms may be able
to write contracts that specify each
party￿s rights and obligations. In an
unpredictable world, things are very
different. Changing circumstances
require adaptive responses, and it may
be impossible to write contracts that are
both flexible enough to permit adjust-
ments and precise enough to give
11In the economics literature, contracts that
do not include detailed clauses to cover all
contingencies are called incomplete contracts.
Typically, contracts are incomplete because
(1) it is very hard to specify all contingencies
in advance, and (2) it is difficult to describe
contingencies with sufficient clarity that a
court can actually enforce the contract.
12Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
interpret this evidence differently as we will
see below.   Business Review  Q3 2001   17 www.phil.frb.org
within a single firm be better? One
possibility is that information may flow
more easily within an organization than
between organizations. Since members
of a single organization all share in the
same flow of profits, cooperation may be
more the norm, and sales personnel and
designers within the same firm may
have fewer incentives to withhold
information.13 This cooperation can be
facilitated through judiciously designed
internal compensation schemes.
Furthermore, to the extent that the
information flows are the result of
conscious design, the firm￿s top manage-
ment can encourage the free flow of
useful information. This may be
particularly important when disputes
arise, as they inevitably will, between
separate divisions of a single firm.
Apart from the value of a freer
flow of information, the resolution of
disputes between divisions may be eased
by the use of administrative fiat; that is,
top management can impose an
outcome when the sales and engineer-
ing divisions can￿t come to agreement on
their own. Firms often have specialized
internal mechanisms for handling more
serious disputes. For example, in a case
study of a high technology firm￿s choice
between purchasing inputs from
external sources and producing the
inputs internally ￿ sometimes called
the make or buy decision ￿ Marc Knez
and Duncan Simester found that
disputes between the engineering and
sales divisions were arbitrated by ￿chief
technologists,￿ usually former engineers
who acted as final judge. Knez and
Simester also found that in this firm,
arbitration was never used to resolve
disputes between outside producers of
inputs and the purchasing firm.
ASSETS ARE POWER
The property rights approach
also addresses the problem of designing
organizations to mitigate the effects of
the disputes that inevitably arise in the
course of doing business in an unpredict-
able world. But the property rights view
doesn￿t agree that keeping a transaction
within the firm is more likely to lead to
improved information flows or greater
incentives for individuals to cooperate.14
Accordingly, the underlying thought
experiment differs from that of the
transactions cost approach. Property
rights theorists begin with separate
organizations ￿ separate firms or even
separate divisions of the same firm ￿
and with a description of the various
assets needed to carry out business
transactions. For a property rights
theorist, the underlying question is:
￿Who should own which assets?￿ 15
To illustrate this approach, let￿s
go back to our example. There are three
distinct organizations: AC￿s manufac-
turing division, AC￿s sales division, and
independent manufacturers￿ rep, DC.
To simplify, imagine that there are just
two types of assets: the machines used to
produce electronic components and the
sales lists of customers who have bought
each component in the past.  In the
property rights view, AC and DC would
be viewed as independent firms only if
AC owns the machines and DC owns
the customer list.  The fundamental
feature that distinguishes DC from AC￿s
internal sales division is that DC owns its
13The property rights theorists discussed in
the next section disagree strongly with these
claims.
14The property rights approach ignores
differences in the way information flows
between firms and within firms and also
ignores differences in the details of compensa-
tion schemes.
15This approach was originated by Oliver Hart
and Sanford Grossman and was developed
subsequently by Oliver Hart and John Moore
in a series of articles.  See Hart￿s 1995 book
for an accessible introduction.18   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
customer list while AC￿s sales division
doesn￿t.
Owners Are Powerful.  In
the property rights view, if someone
owns an asset, he or she has the power to
exclude others from using it.16 For
example, the owner of the customer list
controls an essential link between AC
and its potential customers; knowing
who has purchased a product in the
past is very valuable knowledge when
AC wants to market an advanced
version of an existing component.
Without this knowledge AC would
have to rely on expensive scattershot
methods to inform potential customers
of the new product (e.g., commercial
time during the Super Bowl).
Consider the case where AC
and DC are separate firms, that is, DC
owns the customer list, and imagine that
one of DC￿s important customers insists
on a costly customization of a compo-
nent. DC￿s credo is: ￿The customer is
always right!￿ But AC￿s engineers are
under severe pressure to keep costs in
line after a number of embarrassing cost
overruns. AC￿s engineers prefer that the
customer accept a modest customization
(at most) and that the costs of produc-
ing the tailor-made product be charged
to the customer. DC￿s sales personnel
argue that they have made promises
that AC would work closely with the
customer to adapt the component.
Who will win this dispute?
The owner of the customer list, DC, is
likely to win because it has a lot of
bargaining power. It holds the (mainly
implicit) threat to walk away with the
customer list and to peddle its services to
conflicts than in conflicts with an
independent manufacturers￿ rep.
All Power to the People
(Whose Efforts Are Most Valuable).
If disputes, large and small, cordial and
hostile, are the warp and the woof of
16Proponents of the property rights view are
well aware that this definition is a simplifica-
tion, but one chosen to facilitate formal
analysis. In a recent contribution, Raghuram
Rajan and Luigi Zingales have proposed a
more nuanced view of ownership in which the
owner can regulate access to an asset and also
regulate access to those who work with the
asset. This extension is important because, in
many cases, it is the knowledge and expertise
of the team of employees working with an
asset that is most valuable rather than
ownership of the asset itself. Phillipe Aghion
and Jean Tirole propose another significant
extension and distinguish formal ownership
and real ownership ￿ which requires the
owner to be well informed enough to know
how to make good use of the asset.
17Economists call this the ￿hold-up problem.￿
18What￿s to keep the head of sales from
walking away with the customer list?
Noncompete clauses are customary in
situations such as these.
Conflicts are pervasive both within and be-
tween firms. But an internal sales division
doesn￿t have the same bargaining power as an
independent firm, since the head of the sales
division can￿t walk away with the sales list.
one of AC￿s competitors.17 This threat is
a powerful one, since AC may find it
very difficult to quickly re-establish a
channel to existing customers without
the customer list.
After enough disputes like this,
the head of engineering at AC might
well ask herself whether it wouldn￿t be
more profitable to sell a larger share of its
products through its own in-house sales
division. The property rights view
emphasizes that the head of engineering
would be na￿ve to expect that conflicts
would be less pervasive within a single
firm or that internal sales personnel
would be more concerned about the
engineering division￿s cost control efforts
than would independent sales person-
nel.  Conflicts are pervasive both within
and between firms. But an internal sales
division doesn￿t have the same bargain-
ing power as an independent firm, since
the head of the sales division can￿t walk
away with the sales list.18 Thus, the
head of engineering can reasonably
expect to prevail more often in internal
business life, it is easy to see why the
head of engineering at AC or the
president of DC would be concerned
about who owns which assets. However,
from an efficiency standpoint ￿ that is,
if we are primarily concerned about
increasing individuals￿ incentive to
make jointly valuable investments ￿ it
is not immediately clear that it matters
who prevails more often. Cutting costs
and satisfying unique customer needs
are both worthy business goals, and how
the engineers of AC, the sales personnel
of DC, and the sales personnel of AC￿s
sales division divide up the profits
doesn￿t seem to be an important issue to
anyone but themselves.
In fact, relative bargaining
strengths do matter because members of
the different organizations invest time
and effort that increases the value of
their joint output, but each member￿s
willingness to make such investments
depends on his or her own expected
return on the investment. The central
idea of the property rights view is that
bargaining power ￿ and the assets that
confer bargaining power ￿ should be in
the hands of those people whose efforts
are most significant in increasing the
value of the business relationship. Giving
these people more bargaining power
ensures that they receive more of the   Business Review  Q3 2001   19 www.phil.frb.org
rewards from investing time and energy
and, thus, that they have a stronger
incentive to make these investments.19
Who Should Own the
Customer List? Two Examples.
Consider a component that comes in
many varieties, each one tailored to a
particular type of user, or one that
requires extensive follow-up service.
Here the relationship between the sales
organization and the customer is
paramount. Sales personnel must know
their customers￿ needs; indeed, the
seller may play a significant role in
advising the customer, both at the time
of sale and after.
For products such as these, the
most important investments are made by
the sales organization, and the sales
organization should own the customer
list to capture a larger share of the profits
from providing excellent customer
service.  Theory would predict that
these products should be sold by DC,
rather than by AC￿s in-house sales
organization.20 Increasing DC￿s
bargaining power can also increase AC￿s
profits, even if AC￿s engineers often
have difficulty winning disputes. DC￿s
investments in customer service also
increase the value of AC￿s investments
in product design. Thus, giving DC lots
of bargaining power can significantly
increase the sum of AC￿s and DC￿s firm-
specific investments and the total profits
to be divided.21
Consider another class of
components in which AC is a leader in
product innovation, but which are
mainly standardized and which require
little follow-up servicing. In this case, a
knowledgeable sales force may still be
necessary to educate customers about
new products, but a close relationship
between sales personnel and customers
hold-up problems as the central
influence on the design of firms.
Instead, this approach draws out the
implications of a simple, but powerful
pair of insights: (1) Most managers and
employees are engaged in the produc-
tion of many outputs ￿ or, viewed
differently, engaged in a variety of tasks;
(2) Some outputs are easy to measure,
and some are hard to measure.22
For example, the members of
any sales force are really engaged in a
variety of activities when they sell a
component.  The most obvious is the
sale itself, something that is relatively
easily measured. But sales personnel also
collect information about customers￿
needs and problems, and this informa-
tion can be tremendously valuable to
the product￿s designers and engineers.
Unlike booking a sale, diligence and
ingenuity in collecting information are
hard to measure. Of course, these
activities will ultimately be reflected in
future sales, but the effects may take a
long time to come to fruition, and they
will be spread widely.
When Measurement Is
Difficult, Low-Powered Incentives
Are Best.   Consider a compensation
scheme such as the one between AC
and DC, a straight percentage commis-
sion on total sales. When sales personnel
are heavily rewarded for the volume of
sales, they will predictably allocate their
time and attention to selling, and they
will neglect the less rewarding task of
collecting intelligence to be passed on to
AC￿s designers. Thus, providing high-
powered rewards for easily measured
outputs will lead individuals (and their
organizations) to neglect tasks that may
19However, David de Meza and Ben
Lockwood￿s article demonstrates that the
question of who should be given power over
assets may be slightly more complicated than
this discussion suggests. In particular, we
need to know more about the details of the
bargaining environment to make precise
predictions.
20Note that Anderson and Schmittlein￿s
evidence that standardized electronic
components are sold by independent
manufacturers￿ representatives is inconsistent
with this interpretation. However, for the
most part, it has proved relatively difficult to
devise convincing and powerful empirical
tests that distinguish one theory￿s empirical
predictions from another￿s. See Michael
Whinston￿s paper for one attempt to devise a
formal framework for distinguishing between
the predictions of the transactions cost and
property rights approaches.
is not as important. For these compo-
nents, the customer list should not be
owned by an independent sales
organization such as DC. The customer
list is still very valuable, and DC￿s
bargaining power would mainly
undercut AC￿s engineers￿ incentive to
work hard without a countervailing
gain.
RICHES BEYOND MEASURE
A third approach, the multitask
approach, doesn￿t view bargaining and
22The multitask approach has been developed
in a series of papers by Bengt Holmstrom and
Paul Milgrom, although the insight that
measurement problems are central to a theory
of the firm figures prominently in Yoram
Barzel￿s work. Milgrom￿s paper with John
Roberts on influence costs ￿ politicking
within firms ￿ is another application of the
multitask approach.
21In the language of the formal theory,
individuals￿ investments in human capital are
complements. One individual￿s investment in
human capital raises the marginal return to





puts will lead individu-
als (and their organi-
zations) to neglect
tasks that may be
important but whose
results are difficult to
measure.20   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
be important but whose results are
difficult to measure.
For some products, collecting
intelligence from AC￿s customers and
transmitting it to AC￿s designers is very
important. According to the multitask
approach, such products should be sold
by the in-house sales division, not DC￿s
sales reps. And the lion￿s share of the in-
house sales staff￿s compensation should
be a fixed salary ￿ a low-powered
compensation scheme, in the sense that
pay is not closely related to measured
performance.23
Of course, this compensation
scheme has inevitable drawbacks, too.
Internal sales personnel may allocate
their time more appropriately between
activities with short- and long-term
payoffs, but they may simply work less
hard than DC￿s sales force. AC can
partially counter this drawback and also
directly reward employees￿ effort on
difficult-to-measure activities by using
compensation and promotion schemes
tied to subjective performance evalua-
tions by supervisors.24
Measurement Difficulties
Also Help Explain Job Design. The
multitask view suggests that jobs may
also be designed differently depending
on whether components are sold by an
in-house sales force or by independent
manufacturers￿ representatives. For
example, if one salesperson offers the
products of numerous producers, each
producer will worry that its own product
is being shortchanged. Many firms avoid
this problem by using an in-house sales
force that sells its firm￿s products
exclusively.
But this only raises another
question. Why not insist on an exclusive
sales relationship with the independent
manufacturers￿ rep also?  Why doesn￿t
each sales organization agree to sell only
one manufacturer￿s product line at a
time?25 One reason is that for some
types of products, there isn￿t a lot to gain
from an exclusive relationship.  When it
is easy to measure and reward a sales-
person￿s effort in selling a product, an
exclusive relationship isn￿t necessary.
Sales figures will accurately reflect the
time and effort that sales personnel have
spent in selling each manufacturer￿s
products. For some products AC can
simply examine DC￿s sales of AC￿s
components to make sure that DC is not
promoting a competitor￿s product at
AC￿s expense.
On the other hand, the goods
handled through in-house employees
(and not by independent reps) are sold
that way precisely because sales figures
are not good measures of sales effort for
some types of components.  The same
measurement problems that cause AC
to use internal sales personnel and low-
powered incentive schemes for some
products also cause AC to impose
exclusivity on its sales employees. The
simplest way to make sure that the
employee is not shifting time and
attention to promote a competitor￿s
components is to impose exclusivity.
While it may be hard to keep close tabs
on an employee￿s allocation of time
among various sales activities, it is
relatively easy to check whether he or
she is selling another firm￿s products on
company time.
CONCLUSION
Recent theories of internal
organization offer some general lessons
for a financial services firm that￿s
thinking about moving into new product
lines by integrating backward or forward
or by selling related products. Perhaps
the most important general insight is
that while engaging in complementary
activities may be part of the rationale for
expanding a firm￿s activity mix, the firm
must also take serious account of
incentives. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act has introduced a new category of
activities, activities complementary to
banking, that could be provided through
financial holding companies.  The act
requires that bankers seeking to engage
in a new, complementary activity must
describe the nature of the complemen-
tarity in detail. Although regulators will
not demand that bankers analyze
incentive considerations when new
activities are brought into the firm,
bankers themselves would be well
advised to take their own analyses
further than the law demands.
Indeed, the starting point of
Oliver Williamson￿s investigations into
While engaging in complementary activities
may be part of the rationale for expanding a
firm￿s activity mix, the firm must also take
serious account of incentives.
23Anderson and Schmittlein￿s characteriza-
tion of the difference between compensation
schemes for in-house sales employees and
independent manufacturers￿ reps is clearly
consistent with this theory.
24See Robert Gibbons￿s and Canice
Prendergast￿s surveys for evidence on the use
of subjective evaluation in the workplace. An
interesting feature of employing subjective
evaluations is that internal politicking to
influence supervisors￿ evaluations becomes a
significant problem in organizational design.
See Milgrom and Roberts￿ article on influence
activities.
25Actually, this hypothetical arrangement has
features in common ￿ notably exclusivity ￿
with traditional retail franchise relationships.
See Francine Lafontaine and Margaret
Slade￿s article for an evaluation of the
empirical literature on retail franchising.   Business Review  Q3 2001   21 www.phil.frb.org
the transactions cost motivations for
vertical integration was the recognition
that even highly complementary
activities could be profitably carried out
by separate firms if the terms of the
transactions between the firms are
relatively predictable and don￿t require
relationship-specific investments. In
these cases, specialized firms may well
achieve a high degree of coordination
through contracts alone, because
individuals￿ incentives to disagree are
small and easily overcome.
While the theoretical work is
not yet sufficiently well developed to
give bank managers precise guidance,
the theories do yield some important
insights. One of the central insights of
the property rights view is that bargain-
ing problems don￿t just disappear when
transactions are brought within a single
firm.  The key is to assign ownership
rights over assets to those whose effort
produces the most value for the firm.
For example, many bank holding
companies have discovered that
purchasing an investment banking
subsidiary doesn￿t improve coordination
between commercial bankers and
investment bankers ￿ one of the
ostensible benefits of having a single
company handle both activities ￿ and
may simply multiply tensions.26 A stand-
alone investment firm or one with
significant autonomy within a holding
company structure may be more
realistic, because it may allow invest-
ment bankers to capture a larger share
of the rewards from their customer
relationships.27
The multitask approach
teaches that for complex products,
organizations face difficult tradeoffs
between providing incentives for
maximal effort and promoting coopera-
tion and other hard-to-measure
activities. An example of these tradeoffs
is the continuing tension between the
sales-oriented activities of commercial
lenders ￿ it is easy to measure and
reward lenders according to new
accounts gained ￿ and their responsi-
bility to closely monitor credit quality ￿
it is intrinsically more difficult to
measure careful monitoring of the credit
risk of existing accounts. Generally, the
multitask approach states that difficult-
to-measure tasks should be handled by
employees, with subjective evaluations
supplementing otherwise low-powered
incentive schemes. The approach also
suggests that, to the greatest extent
possible, easy-to-measure tasks and
difficult-to-measure tasks should be
assigned to separate individuals or
groups.
While the theories yield many
practical insights, economists who have
been influential in developing the
theory of the firm argue that testing
theories against each other in careful
empirical studies is the most immediate
task at hand.28 Such testing should
yield more refined economic insights
into existing business practices and
hopefully more refined guidance to
businesses making practical decisions.
26In the business press and management
literature, problems like these have often
been classified as ￿cultural conflicts.￿
27Of course, it may be difficult for the front
office to precommit not to meddle in the
affairs of any of its supposedly autonomous
affiliates.
28Michael Whinston￿s paper attempts to
formalize the different predictions of the
property rights view and the transactions cost
view within a common framework. His
conclusion is that the theories have not yet
been developed with sufficient precision to
distinguish them empirically.22   Q3 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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